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Abstract. During emergency scenarios, the large number of possible influences 
inter se between cognitive and affective states of the individuals involved 
makes it difficult to analyse their (collective) behaviour. To study the behaviour 
of collectives of individuals during emergencies, this paper proposes a 
methodology based on formalisation of empirical transcripts and agent-based 
simulation, and applies this to a case study in the domain of the 7/7 London 
bombings in 2005. For this domain, first a number of survivor statements have 
been formalised. Next, an existing agent-based model has been applied to 
simulate the scenarios described in the statements. Via a formal comparison, the 
model was found capable of closely reproducing the real world scenarios. 
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1   Introduction 
During large-scale emergencies such as terrorist attacks or natural disasters, the 
involved persons may behave in unexpected ways. For example, some individuals 
may immediately start panicking and ‘lose control over their actions’, whereas others 
may emerge as ‘calm leaders’ helping other people. Especially in larger crowds, the 
numerous possible influences of mental states within individuals (e.g., person A has 
the belief that he will die, and therefore starts panicking) and between individuals 
(e.g., person B manages to calm down person A) makes it very difficult to predict 
how a certain crowd will behave in a particular situation. Nevertheless, gaining more 
insight into the dynamics of these processes is very useful, since it enables policy 
makers to explore possibilities for developing procedures and interventions that may 
minimise the number of casualties in such emergency scenarios (e.g., providing 
emergency exits at appropriate locations, or equipping patrollers with intelligent 
devices that recommend escape routes). In line with recent developments [2,13], this 
paper proposes to study such dynamics using agent-based simulations. 
More specifically, to be able to analyse the dynamics of mental states and their 
intra- and interpersonal interaction in emergency scenarios, an agent-based simulation 
424 T. Bosse et al.  
model ASCRIBE (Agent-based Social Contagion Regarding Intention Beliefs and 
Emotions) has been developed [9]. This model has been inspired by several concepts 
from Social Neuroscience [6,7], including the concepts of mirror neuron (i.e., a type 
of neuron that fires not only when an individual performs an action, but also when 
he/she observes this action performed by someone else [10,11]) and somatic marker 
(i.e., a feeling induced by a certain decision option considered by an individual, which 
helps the individual make decisions by biasing that option [1,7]). Based on these 
concepts, the ASCRIBE model describes how for different individuals in a crowd, the 
strength of their beliefs, intentions and emotions may evolve. 
The main goal of the current paper is to show how the model can be used to 
analyse the dynamics of individuals’ mental states for a real world incident. To this 
end, a case study is undertaken which analyses the London bombings of July 7th, 
2005. To test the applicability of the model to this case, a research methodology is 
followed that consists of a number of steps. First, a set of survivor statements which 
were extracted from the ‘Report of the 7 July Review Committee’ [12], have been 
formalised using a dedicated ontology. Next, the ASCRIBE model has been applied 
to generate a number of simulation runs for fragments of the scenarios described in 
the survivor statements. And finally, the results of the simulations have been 
compared with the formalised survivor statements, both in an informal and in a formal 
manner (using an automated tool). 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief 
description of the London bombings. Section 3 explains how statements of survivors 
of the attack were obtained and converted to formal notation. Section 4 summarises 
the main mechanisms of the ASCRIBE model and Section 5 shows how the model 
was applied to the London bombings scenario. Section 6 discusses the (formal) 
comparison between the simulation runs and the formalised statements and Section 7 
concludes the paper with a discussion. 
2   London Bombings  
The London bombings of July 7, 2005 (also referred to as 7/7) involved 4 suicide 
bombers triggering explosions on the London Underground and Bus transport 
network. Two of these bombings took place on underground trains outside Liverpool 
Street and Edgeware Road stations and a third one between King’s Cross and Russell 
Square. These bombs went off at around 8:50 in the morning during the ‘rush hour’ 
when most commuters travel to their workplaces. The fourth bomb went off on a 
double-decker bus at Tavistock Square about an hour later. 52 people were killed and 
more than 770 were injured, see [12]. 
3   Formalisation of Survivor Statements 
Below, Section 3.1 describes how statements of survivors of the attack were obtained, 
and Section 3.2 explains how these were converted to formal notation. 
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3.1   Survivor Statements  
The July 7 Review Committee was set up to ‘identify the successes and failings of the 
response to the bombings and to help improve things for the future…’ [12] and 
submitted its report to the London Assembly in June 2006. Information from nearly 
85 individuals was obtained as part of this report to the London Assembly. These 
accounts consist of unstructured narratives from individuals involved in the incident 
and run into 299 pages of text. Of these, 21 are fairly detailed accounts of the 
experiences of the respective survivors depending on the proximity to the explosion 
of the concerned survivor, the evacuation process and after-effects on survivors 
including the psychological. 12 accounts relate to a public hearing held on 23 March 
2006 and 9 relate to private meetings with the chairman of the Review Committee. 
The rest of the accounts consist of information provided by survivors and affected 
persons through email and letters.  
The July 7 Review Committee also obtained information and views from nearly 40 
organisations. These accounts consist of unstructured narratives and written 
submissions of officials from a broad range of organisations including the police, fire 
brigade, ambulance, hospitals, local authorities, telecommunication companies and 
business associations and  run into 284 pages of text. For the purposes of this paper, 
only transcripts of individual survivors in their original form have been included in 
the analysis. 
Statements of survivors are publicly accessible and available as a consolidated 
Volume 3 of the July 7 Review Report, in pdf as well as rich text format. The 
statements have been anonymised and so the names in the statements do not refer to 
the actual identity of the survivor. An example of a transcript of a survivor given the 
name ‘John’ and who was at the Edgeware Road Station site of the bombings, is 
shown in Figure 1 below.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Extract from John’s transcript at the July 7 Review Committee hearing 
The transcript was parsed into phrases that as far as possible conveyed a single idea 
leaving the statement in its original form. These phrases were treated as indications 
for ‘cues’ that help explain the behaviour and thoughts of the survivor. References to 
the location, time and elapsed time were also put alongside the cues. These have been 
either explicitly stated or inferred from surrounding statements in the transcript for the 
survivor. Each of the phrases was then formalised according to the scheme explained 
in the following sub-section. An extract from the parsing table for ‘John’s transcript’ 
is shown below in Figure 2. 
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Fig. 2. Parsing table for John’s transcript 
3.2   Formalisation 
As a first step towards formalisation of the survivor statements, a time stamp has been 
assigned to each cue. Since little information is known about the actual time and 
duration of the events, we simply used natural numbers to describe the timing of the 
subsequent events (i.e., we say that they took place at time point 0, 1, 2, and so on). 
After that, the content of the cues was analysed in more detail, to make an inventory 
of the classes of concepts they refer to. In general, each cue turned out to refer either 
to a belief or an action. Moreover, each belief or action belonged either to the survivor 
himself, or another individual at the scene. For example, the statement ‘there was a 
massive bang’ refers to a belief of the speaker himself (namely that a blast had 
occurred), whereas the statement ‘I put my hands and arms over my ears and head’ 
refers to an action of the speaker. Similarly, the statement ‘a young woman sitting 
next to me asked me if I was OK’ refers to an action of another individual. 
Furthermore, two types of beliefs could be distinguished, namely, beliefs that are 
triggered by an external stimulus (e.g., ‘there was a massive bang’) and those 
triggered by an internal stimulus or thought (e.g., ‘I thought I was going to die’). 
Table 1. Domain Ontology 
Predicate informal meaning
has_belief(a:AGENT, b:BELIEF) agent a has belief b 
has_internal_belief(a:AGENT, b:BELIEF) agent a has (internally triggered) belief b 
performed(a:AGENT, ac:ACTION) agent a performs action ac 
Sort elements
AGENT {john, man_in_front, young_woman, …} 
ACTION {protect_head, rub_eyes, …} 
BELIEF {blast_has_occurred, risk_of_injury, …} 
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Based on this analysis of the content of the cues, a formal domain ontology (or 
signature) has been developed. For this purpose, the LEADSTO language has been 
used, which is an extension of order-sorted predicate logic [4]. In this language, the 
domain under analysis can be described in terms of sets of sorts and subsorts 
relations, constants in sorts, functions, and logical predicates over sorts. An overview 
of the domain ontology developed for the current case study is provided in Table 1.  
Note that the predicates have been chosen in such a way that they can be easily 
mapped onto concepts in the ASCRIBE model. These predicates have generic names. 
The elements of the sorts are domain-specific, and depend on the particular scenario. 
After development of the domain ontology, the actual formalisation of the cues 
was done. To this end, for each survivor, the following algorithm was executed(?) 
(described in pseudo-code): 
 
start with an empty specification 
for t = time step 1 to last-time do 
1. determine whether the cue at time t refers to a belief (either ‘internal’ or 
‘external’) or action 
2. determine to which agent the cue belongs  
3. select the appropriate predicate from the domain ontology 
4. express the cue formally using that predicate, and add the result to the 
specification, annotated with time step t 
end 
 
As an illustration, Figure 3(a) shows (a visualisation of) the resulting formalisation 
of the survivor statement that was shown in the earlier Figure 1, in an example trace. 
In this figure, which contains a fragment of 30 time steps, time is on the horizontal 
axis; a box on a line indicates that an event is true at that time point. 
As a final step, the events included in the formal traces needed to be connected to 
concepts within the ASCRIBE model, enabling us to apply the model to the scenarios 
under investigation. The main concepts present in ASCRIBE are beliefs, intentions, 
and emotions, which may be related either to specific world states or to decision 
options (see Section 4 for details). Thus, as an example, the ‘external beliefs’ were 
translated into ‘beliefs about the positiveness of the situation’ and ‘belief options’ in 
ASCRIBE, the ‘internal beliefs’ were translated into ‘emotions’ (of fear) in 
ASCRIBE, and the ‘actions’ were translated into ‘intention options’ in ASCRIBE. For 
the belief and intention options, two types of actions were distinguished, namely 
‘protective actions’ (e.g., covering one’s ears) and ‘social actions’ (e.g., comforting 
another passenger). Moreover, during these translations, numerical values (from the 
set {0, 0.1, 0.2, …, 0.9, 1}, where 0.5 represents a neutral value) have been assigned 
to the strength of each state. For example, the belief that a blast has occurred clearly 
refers to a very negative situation (e.g., value 0.1), whereas the belief that help is 
underway refers to a positive situation (e.g., value 0.9). To guarantee inter-observer 
reliability, as a pre-test, part of the survivor statements have been formalised 
separately by two different observers. When comparing the results, the differences 
turned out to be small: besides minor interpretation errors, the distance between the 
numerical scores of the two observers never were greater than 0.2. 
An example of the outcome of this final step is shown in Figure 3(b). Note that this 
figure corresponds to the same scenario as in Figure 3(a), but that a larger fragment 
(of 70 time steps) has been taken. As shown in the first graph, the positiveness of this 
agent (named John) fluctuates during the scenario. Initially (i.e. right after the 
explosion), he has some rather negative beliefs about the situation, but based on the 
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development of the events, he starts to have some more positive beliefs from time 
point 20. The same pattern is repeated in the period between time point 40 and 70. 
Similarly, the other graphs show John’s level of emotion (fear in this case), and the 
extent to which his actions are ‘protective’ or ‘social’ actions. Note that the graphs 
only show some values, that is when the information has been available; at the other 
time points nothing is shown. In Section 5, these kinds of information bits will be 
used for simulating the scenarios. In particular, the information shown in the first 
graph (beliefs about the situation) will be used as input for the ASCRIBE model, 
whereas the information from the other three graphs (emotions, protective and social 
actions) will be used to compare with the output of the model. 
  
 
Fig. 3. Example formal trace – qualitative (a) and quantitative (b) information 
4   Simulation Model 
To simulate the dynamics of beliefs, emotions and intentions of individuals involved 
in the 7/7 London bombings of 2005, the agent-based model ASCRIBE [9] was used 
and implemented in Matlab. For a complete overview of ASCRIBE, see [9]. In this 
section, the model is only briefly summarised and explained in terms of how it was 
tailored  to the 7/7 London bombings case. The main concepts present in the original 
ASCRIBE model [9] are beliefs, intentions, and emotions. For the current purpose, the 
following specific states for the agents were taken, namely 1 emotional state per agent 
(fear), 2 intentional states per agent (either to perform a protective or social action) 
and 3 beliefs (one about the ‘positiveness’ of the situation and two about whether an 
agent should perform a protective or social action):   
fear of agent A      qfearA(t) 
intention indication for action option O of agent A  qintention(O)A(t) 
belief in X (either about situation or action) of agent A  qbelief(X)A(t) 
In Figure 4, which is adapted from [9], an overview of the interplay of these different 
states within the model is shown. It is assumed that at the individual level the strength 
of an intention for a certain action option depends on the person’s beliefs (cognitive 
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responding) in relation to that option. It is also assumed that beliefs may generate 
certain emotions (affective responding), for example that of fear, that in turn may 
affect the strength of beliefs (affective biasing). Note that it is assumed that these 
latter emotions are independent of the different action options. The contagion of all 
the different states between individuals is based on the concept of a mirror neuron 
(e.g., [10,11]) in Neuroscience. When states of other persons are mirrored by some of 
the person’s own states, which at the same time play a role in generating their own 
behaviour, then this provides an effective basic mechanism for understanding how in 
a social context, individuals affect each other’s mental states and behaviour.  
 
Fig. 4. The interplay of beliefs, emotions and intentions in the 7/7 London bombings context 
Note that all mirroring processes take place through interaction between agents, 
whereas the other processes shown in Figure 4 occur internally, within an individual 
agent. An overview of the different intra- and interpersonal interaction processes is 
given in Table 2.  
Table 2. The different types of processes in the model 
from S to S' type description 
belief(X) fear internal affective response on information; for example,  
on threats and possibilities to escape 
fear fear interaction emotion mirroring by nonverbal and verbal interaction;  
for example, fear contagion 
fear belief(X) internal affective biasing; for example, 
adapting openness or expressiveness 
belief(X) belief(X) interaction belief mirroring by nonverbal and verbal interaction; for example,  
of information on threats and action options 
belief(X) intention(O) internal cognitive response on information; for example, 
aiming for a protective action based on the danger of the situation 
intention(O) intention(O) interaction intention mirroring by nonverbal and verbal interaction; for  
example, of tendency to aim for a social action 
 
The central idea of the model is based upon the notion of contagion strength γSBA 
which is the strength with which an agent B influences agent A with respect to a 
certain mental state S (which, for example, can be an emotion, a belief, or an 
intention). It depends on the expressiveness (εSB) of the sender B, the strength of the 
affective 
biasing 
affective 
responding 
emotion 
mirroring 
belief 
mirroring 
intention 
mirroring 
cognitive 
responding 
intention 
belief emotion 
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channel (αSBA) from sender B to receiver A and the openness (δSA) of the receiver: γSBA 
= εSB αSBA δSA. The level qSA for mental state S of agent A is updated using the overall 
contagion strength of all agents B not equal to agent A: γSA = ΣB≠A γSBA. Then the 
weighed external impact qSA*: for the mental state S of all the agents B upon agent A, 
is determined by: qSA* = ΣB≠A γSBA qSB / γSA. Then, state S for an agent A is updated by: 
qSA(t+Δt) =  qSA(t) +  ψSA γSA [ f(qSA*(t), qSA(t)) - qSA(t)] Δt (1)
Here ψSA is an update speed factor for S, and f(V1, V2) a combination function. This 
expresses that the value for qSA is defined by taking the old value, and adding the 
change term, which basically is based on the difference between f(qSA*(t), qSA(t)) and 
qSA(t). The change also depends on two factors: the overall contagion strength γSA (i.e., 
the higher this γSA , the more rapid the change) and the speed factor ψSA.  
Within the definition of the combination function f(V1, V2) a number of further 
personality characteristics determine the precise influence of the contagion. First, a 
factor ηSA is distinguished which expresses the tendency of an agent to absorb or 
amplify the level of a state S, whereas another personality characteristic βSA represents 
the bias towards reducing or increasing the value of the state S. Thus, the combination 
function f(V1, V2) is defined as follows: 
    f(V1, V2)  =  ηSA [ βSA (1 – (1 - V1)(1 - V2)) + (1-βSA) V1V2 ] + (1 - ηSA) V1 (2)
In the ASCRIBE model, the effects of emotions on beliefs are calculated with the 
formulae in Section 4.1 of [9]. Instead of using these formulae here, the values for 
beliefs about the situation and action options were taken from the empirical data as 
explained in Section 2 and 3. Here, we assume the effects of emotions on beliefs are 
implicitly present in these input values.  
The effect of the emotion fear on beliefs is expressed by the following formula:  
    qfear,A*(t) = νA · (B≠A γfearBA ⋅ qfearB / γfearA) +  
                       (1 - νA)·(X   ωX,fear,A .(1 – pXA)·rXA·qbelief(X)A ) (3)
In formula 3, information has an increasing effect on fear if it is relevant and non 
positive, through informational state characteristics rXA  denoting how relevant, and 
pXA denoting how positive information  X is for person A. The influence depends on 
the impact from the emotion fear by others (the first factor, with weight vA) in 
combination with the influence of the belief present within the person. This qfear,A*(t)  
is used in the equation describing the dynamics of fear: 
qfearA(t+Δt) =  qfearA(t) +  γfearA [ f(qfearA*(t), qfearA(t)) - qfearA(t)] Δt 
with 
f(qfearA*(t), qfearA(t)) = ηfearA [ βfearA (1 – (1 - qfearA*(t))(1 - qfearA(t))) + (1-βfearA) qSA*(t) qSA(t) ] 
 + (1 - ηfearA) qfearA*(t) 
Furthermore, the specific state qemotion(O)A was left out of the current model, since this 
state was not mentioned in the survivor reports and it is not realistic to use in these 
simulations. Therefore, the effect of emotions on intentions in ASCRIBE is left out in 
the current model, leaving the effect of beliefs on intentions calculated as follows: 
qbeliefsfor(O)A(t) = X   ωXOA qbelief(X)A / X   ωXOA 
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where ωXOA indicates how supportive information X is for option O. The combination of 
the group’s aggregated intentions with an agent’s own belief for option O is made by 
a weighted average of the two: 
qintention(O)A**(t) = (ωOIA/ωOIBA)qintention(O)A*(t)  + (ωOBA/ωOIBA) qbeliefsfor(O)A(t) (4)
γintention(O)A* = ωOIBA γintention(O)A (5)
where ωOIA and ωOIBA  are the weights for the contributions of the group intention 
impact (by mirroring) and the own belief impact on the intention of A for O, 
respectively, and  
ωOIBA =ωOIA+ωOBA 
The overall model for the dynamics of intentions for options becomes:
 
qintention(O)A(t + Δt) = qintention(O)A(t) + γintention(O)A* [ηintention(O)A (βintention(O)A (1 - (1- 
qintention(O)A**(t))(1-qintention(O)A(t)))  + (1-βintention(O)A) qintention(O)A**(t)  qintention(O)A(t))   
+ (1 - ηintention(O)A) qintention(O)A**(t)  - qintention(O)A (t)] ⋅ Δt 
(6)
5   Simulation Results 
Multiple survivor reports of the London bombings at 7-7-2005 were formalised, as 
described in Section 2 and 3. As an illustration, in this section the simulation results 
of the ASCRIBE model for one particular instance of this data is shown, namely for 
the scenario described in Section 3, involving the survivor named John. In the 
survivor report of John, the beliefs, emotions and intentions of 3 other persons were 
mentioned as well, therefore the simulation in Matlab was made for 4 agents in total. 
The beliefs of the situation and for the two action options (social action or protective 
action) were taken as inputs of the model. The fear value of John, and the values for 
his intentions to act in a protective or social manner, were produced by the ASCRIBE 
model as outputs. These output values (all between 0 and 1) are shown in Figure 5 
and can be compared to the emotion fear and social and protective actions stated in 
the survivor report, which were formalised and are shown in Figure 3(b). The patterns 
in Figure 5, outputted by the ASCRIBE model, correspond quite well with the 
patterns in the formalised empirical data from the survivor report in Figure 3(b). For 
example, in Figure 3(b) it can be seen that survivor John had a high fear level of 0.9 at 
three points in his report. In the left graph in Figure 5 it can be seen that through the 
interactions with the other agents and the internal affective responding, agent John 
also has a high fear value, fluctuating between 0.7 and 0.9. The right graph in Figure 
5 shows that at the beginning, John aims more for protective actions than social 
actions, which seems the logical thing to do in a dangerous situation. Over all time 
steps, John shows a decrease in his aiming for protective actions in the first 10 time 
steps, followed by an increase till time step 15 and than another decrease till time step 
30. This pattern can also be seen in Figure 3(b), where John’s stated protective actions 
in his report started high, then decreased, increased and finally decreased. In Figure 
3(b) it can also be seen that John stated that he performed social actions, formalised 
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by the value 0.6, around time steps 20-25 and 60-70. Figure 5 shows that the 
ASCRIBE model as well outputs social actions around the value 0.6, around time 
steps 20-25 and 60-70. The difference between Figure 3(b) and Figure 5 is, that in 
Figure 5 all values change dynamically over time, they are continuous, and in Figure 
3(b) the values are only available for certain points in time, taken from the survivor 
report. As a consequence, the total pattern of the real world data is not directly visible 
in the formalisation, like in Figure 3(b), but is visible when simulated by the 
ASCRIBE model. To further validate the ASCRIBE model against the real world 
data, a formal check was performed, where the real world data and the simulation 
results from the ASCRIBE model were compared automatically. This is explained in 
the next section.  
 
Fig. 5. The values for fear and intentions for actions of survivor John 
6   Formal Comparison 
To formally compare the simulation results in Section 5 with the formalised 
transcripts presented in Section 3.2, the TTL Checker Tool [3] has been used. This 
piece of software enables the researcher to check whether certain expected (dynamic) 
properties, expressed as statements in the Temporal Trace Language (TTL) [3], hold 
for a given trace (defined as a time-indexed sequence of states). Since the tool can 
take both simulated and empirical traces as input, it can be used to check 
(automatically) whether the generated simulation runs show similar patterns to the 
real world transcripts. 
Using the TTL Checker Tool, a number of dynamic properties have been verified 
against the traces described in Section 3.2 and 5 (which we will refer to as empirical 
traces and simulation traces, respectively). Some of these properties are presented 
below. To enhance readability, they are represented here in an informal notation, 
instead of a formal TTL notation. Note that the letters mentioned in the round 
brackets are parameters, which can be filled in when checking the property using the 
Checker Tool. 
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P1(a:agent, i1,i2:interval, m:trace) - ‘More positiveness implies more social actions’ 
For intervals i1 and i2 within trace m, if the average positiveness of agent a’s beliefs about 
the situation is higher in i1 than in i2, then agent a will perform more social actions in i1 
than in i2. 
 
P2(a:agent, i1,i2:interval, m:trace) - ‘More positiveness implies less protective actions’ 
For intervals i1 and i2 within trace m, if the average positiveness of agent a’s beliefs about 
the situation is higher in i1 than in i2, then agent a will perform more protective actions in i2 
than in i1. 
 
These dynamic properties (among several others, which are not shown due to space 
limitations) have been checked against the empirical and the simulation traces (where 
for all agents a, the interviewed persons were filled in). To create the intervals, all 
traces have been split up into relevant sub-scenarios (e.g., a part in which a person is 
present within a train carriage, or is present outside the train), and each sub-scenario 
has been cut into two equal halves, which we call intervals. Thus, by checking 
property P1 and P2 for all sub-scenarios, we basically checked whether it was the case 
that people who became more positive during a sub-scenario stopped protecting 
themselves and started to help others, and vice versa. Surprisingly, this property 
turned out to hold for almost all sub-scenarios of the empirical traces. This is an 
interesting finding, which can be potentially explained by the phenomenon that 
positive people are more open to external stimuli [8]. In addition, the property holds 
true for the simulated traces for the exact same sub-scenarios as in the empirical 
traces. Although this is obviously not an exhaustive proof of the correctness of the 
ASCRIBE model, it illustrates that the model can be used to reproduce similar 
patterns found in realistic scenarios. 
7   Discussion 
In this paper, it has been shown how the dynamics of individuals’ mental states in a 
real world emergency can be analysed, through formalising survivor reports of the 7/7 
London bombings in 2005 and evaluating them against generated simulations of the 
same case study with the ASCRIBE model. It is quite rare to work with this type of 
real world data of survivors of a terroristic attack. Nevertheless, the ASCRIBE 
simulations in Section 5 showed that it can simulate corresponding patterns in the 
empirical data of the 7/7 London bombings. The formal check of dynamic properties 
in Section 6 also shows that the ASCRIBE model can be used to reproduce similar 
patterns found in emergency scenarios, as in evacuation after a terrorist attack.  
So far, the results show that the ASCRIBE model can reproduce patterns in the 
dynamics of beliefs, intentions and emotions of people involved in a terroristic attack 
in the real world. The results are promising, and although the transcription work is 
quite time consuming, the current analysis model has been set up in a generic manner, 
which means large parts can be re-used for the analysis of other real world incidents 
or disasters. 
The current paper should mainly be seen as a proof-of-concept. The methodology 
turns out to be applicable to analysis of parts of the 7/7 bombings case study. In future 
work, the authors intend to analyse reports of a larger number of survivors, and to 
address more and different case studies, thereby better testing the robustness of the 
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model. In addition, a more extensive evaluation is planned, using a quantitative 
measure for the correctness of the simulation results. 
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